Posts tagged: Paul Krugman

Another Defense of Niall Ferguson

By , August 21, 2012 1:05 pm

Harvard history professor Niall Ferguson took a shot at President Obama the other day in Newsweek, and in short order Ferguson was taking incoming fire from his own critics, including Paul Krugman, The Atlantic, and Politico, among others. I’m not an expert in either fiscal or foreign policy, so I’ll not comment there. I will say that if Krugman and The Atlantic missed the mark as badly as Politico’s Dylan Byers did, Ferguson’s wounds should heal quickly.

David Frum has come to Ferguson’s defense on the foreign policy front. This is my defense on the English grammar front.

Here is the relevant part of what Byers wrote at Politico:

So, in order to get himself out of that predicament, Ferguson decides to edit the CBO report to satisfy his own conclusions:

If you are wondering how on earth the CBO was able to conclude that the net effect of the ACA as a whole was to reduce the projected 10-year deficit, the answer has to do with a rather heroic assumption about the way the ACA may reduce the cost of Medicare. Here’s the CBO again:

“CBO’s cost estimate for the legislation noted that it will put into effect a number of policies that might be difficult to sustain over a long period of time. The combination of those policies, prior law regarding payment rates for physicians’ services in Medicare, and other information has led CBO to project that the growth rate of Medicare spending (per beneficiary, adjusted for overall inflation) will drop from about 4 percent per year, which it has averaged for the past two decades, to about 2 percent per year on average for the next two decades. It is unclear whether such a reduction can be achieved …”

Indeed, it is, which is why I wrote what I wrote.

But Ferguson cut the CBO excerpt off mid-sentence and changed the meaning entirely. Here is how that last sentence in the excerpt actually reads:

It is unclear whether such a reduction can be achieved through greater efficiencies in the delivery of healthcare or will instead reduce access to care or the quality of care (relative to the situation under prior law.)

So contrary to what Ferguson leads readers to believe, the CBO report does not state that the reduction is “unclear.” What is “unclear” is whether the reduction will come through greater efficiencies in healthcare delivery or reduced access to care.

So, one more time: The Oxford-trained, Harvard-employed, Newsweek contibutor Niall Ferguson just edited the CBO report to change its meaning.

With all due lack of respect: What are you thinking?

Better question: What was Mr. Byers thinking? I responded to him with the following:

Dylan,

With all due respect, Ferguson’s so-called “selective” edit did not change the meaning of the CBO’s sentence. You did, however.

You wrote, “So contrary to what Ferguson leads the reader to believe, the CBO report does not state that the reduction is ‘unclear.’ What is ‘unclear’ is whether the reduction will come through greater efficiencies in healthcare delivery or reduced access to care.”

Both sentences in that statement are incorrect: 1.) Ferguson’s edited version of the CBO report said “It is unclear whether such a reduction can be achieved” not that the reduction is “unclear.” 2.) Even in its unedited form, the CBO report did not say that it was unclear whether the reduction would come from greater efficiencies OR reduced access to healthcare. No, the CBO said that it was unclear whether the reduction would be ACHIEVED through greater efficiencies. If those efficiencies did not materialize, access to healthcare would be reduced.

Look at it this way: The structure of the CBO sentence in question is not parallel. The verb “achieved” applies only to the first clause and NOT to the second. To see what I mean, let’s remove the first clause:

“It is unclear whether such a reduction can be achieved . . . will instead reduce access to care or the quality of care (relative to the situation under prior law).” Pretty silly sentence if you ask me.

The second clause only makes sense if you excise the verb “can be achieved” as follows: “It is unclear whether such a reduction . . . will instead reduce access to care or the quality of care (relative to the situation under prior law).” In other words, the reduced access to healthcare will be the result of the reduction in Medicare spending rather than the reduction in Medicare spending being the result of reduced access to healthcare.

Thus Ferguson’s edit was not selective at all. According to the CBO, IT IS unclear whether such a reduction can be achieved. The words “through greater efficiencies in the delivery of healthcare” only speak to how that reduction might come.

Me thinks you owe Mr. Ferguson an apology–or at least a correction.

I’ll let you know how Mr. Bryers responds.

UPDATE: Mr. Bryers responded via e-mail, writing:

Hi Gregory,

You’re wrong.

The full sentence: “It is unclear whether such a reduction can be achieved through greater efficiencies in the delivery of healthcare or will instead reduce access to care or the quality of care (relative to the situation under prior law.)”

Break it down: It’s unclear whether A can be achieved through B or will instead reduce C.

As in, “It is unclear whether weight-loss can be achieved through exercise alone or will instead reduce food-intake.” It would be ridiculous to make that mean, “It is unclear whether weight-loss can be achieved.”

Thanks,
D.

I responded in kind, well, the short kind: “Sorry, but you’re still wrong.”

To which he responded:

Gregory,

You agree that there is a reduction?

D.

And dutifully, I replied:

Dylan,

I agree that the CBO projects that the growth rate of Medicare spending will drop (or reduce) from 4% to 2% per year.

Do you agree with the following? And if not, why not?

The second clause only makes sense if you excise the verb “can be achieved” as follows: “It is unclear whether such a reduction . . . will instead reduce access to care or the quality of care (relative to the situation under prior law).” In other words, the reduced access to healthcare will be the result of the reduction in Medicare spending, rather than the reduction in Medicare spending being the result of reduced access to healthcare.

Reduced Medicare spending is, after all, the subject of the verb “reduce” in the CBO sentence I quote above.

Thanks,
Greg

And that’s how things stand at 4:16 PM Mountain Time.

UPDATE (Wed. 8.22 10:22 AM):

Yesterday, Dylan asked:

You agree that there is a reduction?

I responded:

I agree that the CBO projects that the growth rate of Medicare spending will drop (or reduce) from 4% to 2% per year.

Do you agree with the following? And if not, why not?

The second clause only makes sense if you excise the verb “can be achieved” as follows: “It is unclear whether such a reduction . . . will instead reduce access to care or the quality of care (relative to the situation under prior law).” In other words, the reduced access to healthcare will be the result of the reduction in Medicare spending, rather than the reduction in Medicare spending being the result of reduced access to healthcare.

Reduced Medicare spending is, after all, the subject of the verb “reduce” in the CBO sentence I quote above.

A bit later, I read a new post by Byers, one that compared a 2009 CBO statement with the 2011 statement at issue. I quickly wrote Byers:

I just read your “ducks, nitpicks” post in which you virtually concede my argument: The CBO is (was?) unclear whether the reduction can be achieved–yes, the CBO said it more clearly in its 2009 letter, but the bolded quote in the 2011 testimony says essentially the same thing, as I’ve pointed out in my previous e-mail. Seems to me that the bone you want to pick is with the CBO because, I repeat, Ferguson’s quote was fair, ellipsis and all. The CBO–in both quotes–was unsure whether the reduction would be achieved through efficiencies. The possible reduction in care or access to care would be **because** of the reduction in spending.

Spin it as you will, that’s that the CBO says in both bolded quotes in your “ducks, nitpicks” post.

He responded:

Ferguson is suggesting the CBO says there might NOT be a reduction.

And followed up with:

In other words, if you are correct, why did the 2009 CBO say “if so” and “whether”

To which I responded:

Dylan,

You accused Mr. Ferguson of editing the CBO report in “a ridiculous, misleading, ethically questionable way that completely misses the mark” of “chang[ing] the meaning entirely.” And yet, here we are in a two-day e-mail exchange, debating the meaning of the very sentence in question. Ironic, no? I’ll repeat my understanding of the sentence in question one more time.

The short story: In both CBO statements, the first clause is about the HOW of the reduction. The second clause is about the possible EFFECT of any reduction. The CBO statements do not present a case of either/or.

Let’s look at CBO 2011 again–grammatically:

It is unclear whether such a reduction [the object of this sentence] can be achieved through greater efficiencies in the delivery of healthcare.

OR

It is unclear whether such a reduction [the subject or actor in this sentence] will instead reduce access to care or the quality of care (relative to the situation under prior law.)

As I read those two sentences, I see two different concerns on the CBO’s mind: 1.) a question of whether greater efficiencies will lead to a reduction of Medicare spending, and 2.) a concern about the effect of a reduction in Medicare spending–however that reduction comes about. The first is a question of HOW. The second is a concern about EFFECT.

That reading is buttressed by the CBO’s 2009 letter

“It is unclear whether such a reduction in the growth rate could be achieved, and if so [that is, IF it is achieved], whether

1.) it [the reduction–the object of this clause] would be accomplished through greater efficiencies in the delivery of health care

OR [however it’s achieved]

2.) [the reduction–the subject of this clause] would reduce access to care or diminish the quality of care.”

To repeat: In both CBO statements, the first clause is about the HOW of the reduction. The second clause is about the possible EFFECT of any reduction. The are separate issues or concerns.

As you said yourself in your “Nitpicks” post, had Ferguson quoted the 2009 letter, he would have been on firm ground. My analysis says that he was also well within the bounds of a fair reading of the 2011 statement to claim that the CBO was unclear that a “reduction in the growth rate could be achieved.”

Again, if you’ve got a bone to pick, go pick it with the CBO person who wrote those statements. They could have been written more clearly. So yes, I can see where you’re coming from, but it’s a stretch–and frankly unfair–to claim that your reading is the only correct reading and therefore Ferguson “misses the mark,” is “unethical,” and that he “changed the meaning entirely” of the CBO’s statement.

I don’t know Ferguson. Though I lean right, this is not a partisan issue for me. I simply feel that your post was unfair and responded accordingly.

Respectfully,

Greg Taggart

(All emphasis and most of the formatting in the last e-mail above is mine, something I point out to the general reader, but that I did not say in my original e-mail to Byers since he was familiar with the actual statements.)

Update:
Ferguson defends himself.

With No Evident Sense of Irony

By , February 25, 2011 9:09 am

Paul Krugman is at it again. In a piece titled Shock Doctrine, U.S.A., he sees all sorts of connections between what’s happening in Madison and what happened in Baghdad in 2003. And of course, there’s the obligatory reference to Bush. Can’t have a Governor Scott Walker walking around without a Bush stamped on his forehead like a scarlet letter. That mission accomplished, he takes off in a way that only an op-ed writer cum Nobel laureate can–a laureate with no sense of irony.

Referencing Naomi Klein’s best-selling book “The Shock Doctrine,” he argues that Paul Bremer’s push for privatization in Iraq

was part of a broader pattern. From Chile in the 1970s onward, [Klein] suggested, right-wing ideologues have exploited crises to push through an agenda that has nothing to do with resolving those crises, and everything to do with imposing their vision of a harsher, more unequal, less democratic society.

Ahem, comments by the newly elected Mayor of Chicago come to mind, but that doesn’t count, I suppose, because his and his boss’s multi-trillion dollar exploitation of a crises imposed a vision of a less harsh (for some), more equal (for some), more democratic (for some) society. But I digress.

Krugman continues,

In recent weeks, Madison has been the scene of large demonstrations against the governor’s budget bill, which would deny collective-bargaining rights to public-sector workers. Gov. Scott Walker claims that he needs to pass his bill to deal with the state’s fiscal problems. But his attack on unions has nothing to do with the budget. In fact, those unions have already indicated their willingness to make substantial financial concessions — an offer the governor has rejected.

What he means by the attack on unions having nothing to do with the budget is that . . . hell, I have no idea what he means. If collective bargaining has no impact on Wisconsin’s budget, then union members have been getting screwed by their leaders for a long, long time.

He continues,

What’s happening in Wisconsin is, instead, a power grab — an attempt to exploit the fiscal crisis to destroy the last major counterweight to the political power of corporations and the wealthy.

Pot to kettle and more. Where are the corporations and the wealthy in the drama in Madison? Last I checked, we were talking about public employee unions protesting against the state government, which gets its political power from average Joe Wisconsin.

And the power grab goes beyond union-busting. The bill in question is 144 pages long, and there are some extraordinary things hidden deep inside.

Only 144 pages long? Not over 1,000? And there are some extraordinary things hidden in there too? Really?

I’m out of time, but you get the idea. But if you don’t, let me take you to the 3rd from the last paragraph in Krugman’s piece, the paragraph where he trots some other allegedly evil doers out on to the stage, out from the shadows for all conspiracy theorists to see,

If this [the push for privatization of state-owned power plants] sounds to you like a perfect setup for cronyism and profiteering — remember those missing billions in Iraq? — you’re not alone. Indeed, there are enough suspicious minds out there that Koch Industries, owned by the billionaire brothers who are playing such a large role in Mr. Walker’s anti-union push, felt compelled to issue a denial that it’s interested in purchasing any of those power plants. Are you reassured?

And the left criticizes Glenn Beck. At least he apologizes occasionally.

Res Ipsa Loquitur Because Paul Krugman Won’t

By , January 17, 2011 1:08 pm

Financial columnist and Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman has a decent piece in the New York Times about the Euro crisis, titled Can Europe Be Saved? I won’t spend any time debating what he says about the Euro. In fact, he seems spot on to me; however, in telling the story of the Euro’s problems, Krugman refuses to discuss the elephant in the room, the very same elephant he introduces at the beginning of his piece, but only to praise what he calls “perhaps the most decent societies in human history.” Why? Because the European countries “combin[ed] democracy and human rights with a level of individual economic security that America comes nowhere close to matching.”

As Krugman argues in the second paragraph of the story:

Not long ago Europeans could, with considerable justification, say that the current economic crisis was actually demonstrating the advantages of their economic and social model. Like the United States, Europe suffered a severe slump in the wake of the global financial meltdown; but the human costs of that slump seemed far less in Europe than in America. In much of Europe, rules governing worker firing helped limit job loss, while strong social-welfare programs ensured that even the jobless retained their health care and received a basic income. Europe’s gross domestic product might have fallen as much as ours, but the Europeans weren’t suffering anything like the same amount of misery. And the truth is that they still aren’t. (elephant in bold)

I’ll come back to that elephant in a moment. But first, a summary of Krugman’s story of the Euro: Essentially, European leaders made the case for a single European currency by citing facts that supported a single European market–ignoring the fact that the case for the former was much weaker than the case for the latter. Yes, a single currency would make for easier trading among countries and peoples: Italians visiting England could do so without changing currencies; Germans and French could set contract prices without worrying about fluctuations in the exchange rate. But, if Spain’s real estate market tanked or if Ireland tipped uncomfortably on the edge of bankruptcy, an important tool would no longer be available to them to help resolve the crisis: They could no longer devalue their currencies to deal with wage and prices that are out of line.

In short, those countries no longer have flexible exchange rates in their tool boxes, and as Kruman writes,

These achievements [aka the elephant] are now in the process of being tarnished, as the European dream turns into a nightmare for all too many people. How did that happen?

He then launches into an interesting story of the Coal and Steel Community, Emulsified High-Fat Offal Tubes, the transition to the Euro, and what he calls the Iceland-Brooklyn issue, essentially a metaphor that illustrates what Milton Friedman said, as paraphrased by Krugman: “forming a currency union [such as what Europe did with the Euro] means sacrificing flexibility. As they say, read the whole thing.

Now back to the elephant. Krugman hinted at the elephant problem in that last block quote, but he never draws a bright line from those very expansive, very strong, and way too expensive social-welfare programs and the equally strong labor protections to the economic crisis at hand. That may to too much for the Nobel Prize-winning economist to admit to, given his praise for these “most decent societies.” He does–in spite of himself, but to his credit–draw some dotted lines, as he discusses wage demands, real estate bubbles, borrowing, and the like.

He fails miserably, however, when he discusses the public debt crisis–take Greece for example–and never once ties that debt crisis directly to the social-welfare safety net and labor protections in Europe.

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